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THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions. 
Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced 
by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my stu­
dents. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them. 
My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern 
the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and 
evaluate the decision's desirability. 
Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional ap­
proach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: 
their rhetoric. I use rhetoric here, not in the popular pejorative sense, 
but in the classical meaning of the word. The Supreme Court's opin­
ions are rhetoric in that they are reasoned arguments intended to per­
suade. I believe that we can gain new insights about the Court and 
constitutional law by looking at the opinions from a rhetorical per­
spective. 
Imagine that the Supreme Court decided cases without published 
opinions. This is not inconceivable.' Other branches of government 
generally make their choices without written opinions. Congress gen­
erally provides legislative history for its bills, but it usually is about ex­
plaining the meaning of the provisions more than presenting a persua­
sive argument in favor of a law. Most state and local governments 
don't even provide a formal legislative history for their enactments. 
Presidents tend to act without formal statements justifying their con­
duct. Even in lower courts, cases are most frequently decided without 
published opinion. One study found that there is no written opinion in 
almost seventy-five percent of federal court of appeals decisions.2 But 
every Supreme Court decision has a written opinion.3 
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, 
University of Southern California Law School. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard 
- Ed. I am very grateful to Catherine Fisk for many very helpful conversations discussing 
this topic and to Amy Kreutner for her excellent research assistance. I also am grateful to 
the participants at faculty workshops at Syracuse Law School and Whittier Law School for 
their ideas and suggestions. 
1. Written opinions by courts can be traced back to Roman law and were a key part of 
the English legal tradition that was followed in the United States. See Patricia M. Wald, The 
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.  L. REV. 1371 n.l 
(1995). 
2. Id. at 1713 n.3. 
3. This is not to say that every Supreme Court action has a written opinion. The 
Supreme Court's denials of certiorari, which dispose of over ninety-eight percent of cases 
2008 
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If there were no written opinions, the practice and teaching of law 
would be vastly different. There would be no rules of constitutional 
law announced by the Court; there would only be those principles that 
could be inferred from the Court deciding a case in a particular way. 
Lawyers would argue over what a result means and lower courts 
would try to determine the implications of rulings to avoid being re­
versed. Professors would try to weave the results into a coherent body 
of law and they, not the Court, would then be in control of the rhetoric 
of constitutional law. But obviously, the whole nature and enterprise 
of constitutional law would be vastly different. Just imagine what it 
would be like to teach or study constitutional law if there were no 
written opinions from the Supreme Court. 
In this paper, I want to begin to examine the rhetorical aspects of 
constitutional law and what can be learned by focusing on them.4 In 
any rhetorical enterprise there are three key components: the speaker, 
the message, and the audience.5 Part I of this paper focuses on the 
message - the opinions themselves. Part II looks at the many audi­
ences for Supreme Court opinions and what can be understood about 
the Court and constitutional law from each. Finally, Part III looks at 
the Court as a speaker. 
A few disclaimers at the outset. The focus is only on the Supreme 
Court and not on lower federal courts or state courts. Undoubtedly, 
many of the same characteristics are present in the rhetoric of all 
courts. But there also are differences: a key aspect of the rhetoric of 
lower courts is demonstrating consistency with the rulings of a higher 
court and perhaps trying to predict what the higher court will do.6 
More importantly, focusing on the Supreme Court offers a finite body 
of opinions to examine; the opinions of all of the lower federal and 
state courts seem almost infinite by comparison. 
Also, the focus is exclusively on constitutional, as opposed to statu­
tory, decisions. Again, unquestionably, there are similarities in the 
Supreme Court's decisions, whether constitutional or statutory. There 
are, however, also key differences in how results are explained in con­
stitutional as opposed to statutory cases. There is a voluminous litera-
brought to it, are not justified in a written opinion, though sometimes there are published 
dissents from the denial of certiorari. The law, however, is clear that a denial of certiorari is 
not precedent; it is in no way a decision of the issues in the case. 
4. In working on this, I have come to realize that this Article is only the beginning of a 
much longer, book-length examination of the topic. I thus regard this Article as a rather ten­
tative initial exploration of something I hope to work on for some time to come. 
5. Actually, there is a fourth: a feedback loop where the speaker responds to the reac­
tion of the audience. This, too, is worthy of consideration as to constitutional law, though in 
this Article, I just examine speaker, message, and audience. 
6. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward- Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing whether it is the role 
of lower courts to attempt to predict what the higher court will do). 
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ture on statutory interpretation7 that shows approaches often quite dif­
ferent from the methods of constitutional interpretation. Also, the 
rhetorical enterprise is different because the Court knows that 
Congress can effectively overrule decisions interpreting statutes by re­
vising the laws, but constitutional decisions can be overruled only 
through the cumbersome amendment process.8 
My central thesis is that the opinions written by the Justices and is­
sued by the Court are a central, not an incidental, aspect of American 
constitutional law and that focusing on the opinions as rhetoric can 
help us to understand and appraise the Supreme Court's work. There 
is both a descriptive and a normative aspect to this enterprise: both 
identifying and describing aspects of the rhetoric of constitutional law 
and also normatively assessing the desirability of the Court's actions. 
I. THE MESSAGE 
In this section, I want to focus on characteristics of the opinions 
themselves. Although there are many, here I will focus on four: (A) 
Opinions are written to make results seem determinate and value-free, 
rather than indeterminate and value-based; (B) Opinions are written 
to appear consistent with precedent, even when they are not; (C) 
Opinions are written to make decisions seem restrained, rather than 
activist; dissents criticize decisions as activist and not restrained; and 
(D) The language used by the Court has changed over time; my im­
pression - and I present it as just that, a subjective sense - is that the 
language is less eloquent and more sarcastic than before. 
A. Opinions Are Written to Make Results Seem Determinate and 
Value-Free, Rather Than Indeterminate and Value-Based 
The outcome of the vast majority of Supreme Court cases is inde­
terminate in the sense that reasonable Justices and people can differ as 
to the proper interpretation of the Constitution as it applies to a spe­
cific case. Phrased differently, rarely in constitutional cases can any re­
sult be justified as the one and only correct choice.9 Inescapably, value 
choices need to be made when the Supreme Court interprets constitu­
tional provisions. 
7. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Statutory Interpretation in the Regulatory State, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
8. Also, statutory rulings touch on every area of federal law, most of which are far be­
yond my field. Focusing on constitutional law is, in large part, a function of the desire to stay 
within my field. 
9. Of course, even to speak of "correct" rulings is to beg the question of whether such a 
thing exists and this, too, inherently involves a value choice. 
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The reasons for this are familiar and fairly obvious. Often the 
Court deals with issues where there are no textual provisions to inter­
pret. Is the president entitled to claim executive privilege and what is 
its scope?10  Is there constitutional protection for basic aspects of lib­
erty such as the right to marry,1 1  the right to procreate,1 2  the right to 
custody of one's children,13 the right to keep the family together,1 4  the 
right to raise one's children,15 the right to purchase and use contracep­
tives,16 the right to abortion,17 and the right to refuse medical care?18 
Some might say that the silence of the Constitution should be the basis 
for deciding the cases; but that, of course, is itself a value choice about 
how to interpret the Constitution, and one that the majority of the 
Court has clearly rejected in these decisions. 
Even when there are textual provisions, interpreting them inevita­
bly requires value choices as to their meaning. Is the death penalty as 
applied to the mentally retarded "cruel and unusual punishment" in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment?19 Is government aid to parochial 
schools, in the form of vouchers, a law impermissibly "respecting the 
establishment of religion"?20 
Perhaps most commonly, constitutional cases involve balancing, 
and this inherently requires a value choice. Sometimes there is a con­
flict between two constitutional rights, such as in the recent case where 
the Court had to weigh freedom of the press and the right to privacy in 
deciding whether the First Amendment protects the right of the media 
to broadcast the tape of a conversation that was illegally intercepted 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that executive privi­
lege exists, but is not absolute and must yield to overriding needs for information). 
11. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing a fundamental right 
to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
12. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing a funda­
mental right to procreate). 
13. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing a fundamental right to 
custody, including for unmarried fathers). 
14. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a zoning 
ordinance that prevented a grandmother from living with her grandchildren). 
15. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional an order 
of grandparents' rights over the mother's objection). 
16. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 39-45. 
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973). 
18. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing a 
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment). 
19. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002) (holding that the death penalty for the men­
tally retarded is unconstitutional). 
20. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002) (holding that the Establishment 
Clause is not violated by vouchers used in parochial schools). 
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and recorded.21 Sometimes the very definition of the right requires 
balancing, such as under the Fourth Amendment in deciding what is a 
"reasonable" search or seizure.22 The levels of scrutiny, used through­
out equal protection and individual rights analysis, are a form of bal­
ancing, with the weights arranged on the scale in a particular fashion, 
in favor of the law under rational basis review and against it under 
strict scrutiny. Deciding whether a law serves a compelling or even a 
legitimate interest requires a value choice. 
This seems so obvious as to not even warrant explication. Yet, the 
Supreme Court's opinions rarely acknowledge the indeterminacy of 
the issues or the value choices involved. Quite the contrary, the opin­
ions are written to make it seem that there is only one correct result 
and that it was derived in a formalistic fashion that excludes individual 
value choices.23 Consider how infrequently opinions even acknowledge 
that issues are difficult and present close questions. To the extent the 
indeterminacy is acknowledged or the value choices recognized, it is in 
the dissenting opinions lamenting the majority's approach. 
The legal realists buried formalism in the early decades of the 
twentieth century,24 but in reading Supreme Court opinions, one gets 
the sense that formalism is alive and thriving. This explains the con­
tinuing vitality of originalism in Supreme Court opinions even though 
critics have made a compelling case against it in the scholarly litera­
ture.25 Originalism has the appeal of making it seem that the Court 
isn't making value choices at all, but rather just following the intent of 
the drafters.26 Of course, according such weight to the Framers is itself 
21. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment pre­
cludes the imposition of civil liability for using or disclosing the contents of illegally inter­
cepted communications on a person who was not involved in the interception, but who knew 
or had reason to know that the interception was unlawful). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that reasonableness is 
to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances). 
23. My point here is descriptive - that the Court hides its value choices. Although I 
believe that normatively this is undesirable and that greater candor would be preferaple, I 
recognize that this is a separate argument and would require elaboration beyond the scope 
or length of this Article. For excellent discussions of this topic, see Scott Altman, Beyond 
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). 
24. By formalism, I mean the approach to judicial decisionmaking that sees judges as 
reasoning from determinate premises to determinate results. For an excellent summary of 
the legal realists' critique of formalism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 182-230 (1992). 
25. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradic­
tions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Jeffrey Shaman, 
The Constitution, the Supreme Court and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 257 (1982); 
Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpreta­
tion Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985). 
26. Justice Scalia offers a variant saying that interpretation should focus on "original 
meaning" as evidenced by practices at the time rather than on the Framers' intent. See 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
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a value choice and besides, usually there are choices to make about 
who counts as a Framer, what they thought, and at what level of ab­
straction to state their views. 
An important example of this is the Supreme Court's recent deci­
sions expanding state sovereign immunity. In recent years, the Su­
preme Court has substantially expanded the scope of state sovereign 
immunity, such as by holding that Congress can authorize suits against 
states only if it acts pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment;27 that states cannot be sued under particular federal 
laws, such as for patent infringement28 or for violating the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act29 or for employment discrimina­
tion in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act;30 and 
that state governments cannot be sued in state court without their con­
sent.31 All of these rulings have been by 5-4 margins, with the majori­
ties comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In every case, Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer have dissented. 
Each of these cases ultimately is about a value choice concerning 
the appropriate balance between state government immunity and state 
government accountability. The text of the Constitution provides no 
guidance because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state 
court and even in federal court, it only bars suits against a state by citi­
zens of other states and citizens of foreign countries. Nor is the 
Framers' intent helpful because scholarship has shown that the goal of 
(1997). Yet, discerning the "original meaning," deciding the level of abstraction at which to 
state it, and applying it all involve value choices. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence 
of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REY. 385, 391-401 (2000). 
27. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may override 
the Eleventh Amendment when acting pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment but Congress may not override the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to any other consti­
tutional authority). 
28. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars a claim against a state for violating pat­
ents and that the Patent and Plant Protection Remedy Clarification Act is an unconstitu­
tional exercise of Congress's authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
authorizing federal court jurisdiction for such claims against state governments). 
29. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state governments 
may not be sued in federal court for violating the Age Disc;rimination in Employment Act 
and that the law is not a valid exercise of Congress's section five power that authorizes suits 
against state governments). 
30. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that state 
governments may not be sued for employment discrimination in violation of section one of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
31. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that because of state sovereign immu­
nity, a state government may not be sued in state court without its consent and that Maine 
could not be sued in Maine court for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act without its con­
sent). 
2014 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:2008 
the Eleventh Amendment was simply to preclude suits against states 
based on diversity jurisdiction.32 
Inescapably, the sovereign immunity cases are all about a choice 
between protecting government immunity or ensuring government ac­
countability. Yet, the decisions never acknowledge this. The opinions 
are written without recognizing the underlying value choice being 
made. The closest the Court ever has come is in Alden v. Maine.33 
Justice Kennedy expressly spoke of the need for sovereign immunity 
to protect state treasuries: 
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect 
of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored 
status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its 
treasury or perhaps even government buildings or property which the 
State administers on the public's behalf.34 
But this argument rests on an unsupported, and unacknowledged, 
assumption: that protecting the government treasury is more impor­
tant than the benefits of liability in terms of ensuring compensation 
and deterrence. Sovereign immunity assumes that providing the gov­
ernment immunity, so as to safeguard government treasuries, is more 
important than ensuring government accountability. Yet, in none of 
the sovereign immunity cases has the Supreme Court ever justified 
this value choice. 
Moreover, this is not a value that can be simply assumed to be 
paramount under the Constitution. Basic constitutional principles such 
as ensuring the supremacy of federal law, holding the government ac­
countable, and providing due process all make sovereign immunity 
unacceptable. Although abolishing sovereign immunity would impose 
financial burdens on the government, the question is whether it is bet­
ter to spread the costs of injuries from illegal government actions 
among the entire citizenry than to make the wronged individual bear 
the entire loss.35 
My point is that the Court's sovereign immunity decisions are writ­
ten in highly formalistic language to make it seem that the results are 
dictated by the text and history when such is not the case at all. The 
value choices by the Court are very much hidden and not discussed in 
the majority opinions. 
32. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition 
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amend­
ment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983). 
33. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
34. Id. at 749. 
35. I develop the argument against sovereign immunity in Erwin Chemerinsky, Against 
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001). 
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This is not to say that the indeterminacy of constitutional law and 
the value choices of the Justices are never acknowledged. Most com­
monly, it is dissenting opinions that do so. For instance, in Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, then-Justice Rehnquist 
declared that his dissenting view of the Tenth Amendment would 
someday triumph and that there was no need to say more than that.36 
Even more powerfully, Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, said that he was eighty-three years old 
and would not remain on the Court much longer and the next presi­
dent - to be chosen in November of that year - would make the 
Supreme Court appointment that would decide the future of abortion 
rights.37 In each of these instances, the Justices made it clear how much 
decisions are a product of who is on the Court and their values. But 
such acknowledgments are rare and even jarring when they occur. 
B. Opinions Are Written to Appear Consistent with Precedent, Even 
When They Are Not 
Precedent matters largely, and probably only, because there are 
written opinions. Without them, there would not be any need for 
courts to reconcile their decisions with earlier holdings. Perhaps 
precedent would play some limited role without written opinions in 
that courts would still try to decide like cases in a like manner. But 
stare decisis as we know it would not be the same without pro­
nouncements that count as the law to be followed in future cases. 
An important aspect of the rhetoric of constitutional law is how 
the Supreme Court deals with its precedents.38 The Court writes its 
opinions to make them seem consistent with prior decisions, even 
when they are not. For instance, in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice 
Douglas's majority opinion began by rejecting substantive due process 
as a basis for finding a right to privacy in the Constitution.39 Instead, 
Justice Douglas said that privacy was found in the penumbras of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.40 In doing so, he cited to many cases 
under specific provisions as supporting this view. Among those men-
36. 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
38. Judge Wald writes: "My hunch is that the bulk of the rhetoric of appellate opinions 
is spent in explaining why past cases do or do not apply." Wald, supra note 1, at 1403. 
39. 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965). 
40. One commentator described Justice Douglas's approach by writing: "[In Griswold, 
Douglas] skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader - 'Give me a P . . .  give me 
an R . . .  an I . .  .' and so on, and found P-R-1-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbra! right." 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Pro­
legmenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84. 
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tioned, Douglas listed Meyer v. Nebraska41 and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters42 as First Amendment cases.43 But neither was based on the 
First Amendment; the First Amendment had not yet been incorpo­
rated and applied to the states.44 Meyer and Pierce were unabashedly 
substantive due process decisions finding a right of parents to control 
the upbringing of their children within the liberty of the due process 
clause. But Douglas, in an effort to reject substantive due process and 
to make his approach seem consistent with precedent, mischaracter­
izes the cases.45 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, an important case concerning the First 
Amendment, is another illustration of the Court making it seem that 
its decision is consistent with precedent even when it is not.46 The issue 
in Brandenburg was when speech is "incitement" that falls outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. This, of course, is an issue the 
Court struggled with throughout the twentieth century in some of the 
most important free speech cases.47 In Brandenburg, the test for in­
citement was presented as if the Court were simply reciting well es­
tablished law announced in prior cases. The Court said that its prior 
decisions: 
have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo­
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action.48 
The Court cited to Dennis v. United States49 as establishing this test. 
41. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting teaching of the German 
language violates right of parents to control the upbringing of their children). 
42. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding a state law prohibiting parochial school education un­
constitutional as violating the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children). 
43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82. 
44. The first case to incorporate the First Amendment was Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925), decided shortly after Pierce. 
45. In fact, an even more profound way in which Griswold shows the importance of the 
rhetoric of decisions is Douglas's vehement rejection of substantive due process, even 
though his opinion ultimately relies on it. Douglas finds privacy in the penumbra of the Bill 
of Rights. The Bill of Rights, however, is applied to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, what keeps states from infringing privacy 
- as Douglas himself found it - is the Due Process Clause's prohibition against interfer­
ence with liberty without a sufficient justification: substantive due process. 
46. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
47. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (using a reasonableness test); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (articulating the "clear and present danger" 
test). 
48. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
49. Id. (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951)). 
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But the Brandenburg test is nothing like the one used in Dennis. In 
that case, the Court said that the protection of speech was to be de­
termined by "ask[ing] whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to 
avoid the danger."50 Brandenburg says nothing of the sort. 
Brandenburg emphasizes the need for "imminent harm,'' while Dennis 
expressly rejects such a requirement.51 Brandenburg contains an intent 
requirement: the speech must be directed to causing the harm. Noth­
ing like it is found in Dennis. Brandenburg's approach is very different 
from any prior test for incitement announced by the Supreme Court.52 
But the Court did not acknowledge this; to the contrary, the Court 
made it seem that it was just following precedent. 
The power of precedent also can be seen in the Court's hesitancy 
to overrule earlier cases, even when there seems to be a majority 
available to do so and even when there is a very good reason for doing 
so. I always have been puzzled as to why the Supreme Court in up­
holding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial dis­
crimination by places of public accommodation, relied on the 
Commerce Clause rather than section five of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.53 The obvious answer is that the Civil Rights Cases, in 1883, held 
that Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment only 
could regulate state and local governments and not private behavior.54 
But there clearly seem to have been at least five votes on the Court 
to overrule this aspect of the Civil Rights Cases. Just four years later, 
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,55 the Court overruled the Civil Rights 
Cases' holding that Congress could not regulate private behavior when 
acting pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. In fact, 
just two years later, in United States v. Guest,56 six Justices expressly 
stated that they believed that Congress could regulate private conduct 
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
50. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
51. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion). 
52. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Mo'dern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975) (describing the 
Brandenburg test as "the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme 
Court"). 
53. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
54. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
55. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to private dis­
crimination in housing). 
56. 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (upholding a federal law protecting the right to travel from pri­
vate interference). The six Justices, though, did not join in one opinion so as to make this a 
holding of the Court. 
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In upholding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, only two Justices 
Douglas and Goldberg - said that they preferred to rely on 
section five as authority.57 Why didn't the majority do so? The only 
explanation seems to be that they did not want to write an opinion 
that overruled precedent, especially in upholding an important and 
controversial law. Yet, this rhetorical choice had long-term conse­
quences as the Court in United States v. Morrison,58 in 2000, said that 
the law was clear that the Civil Rights Cases never had been overruled 
and that Congress could not regulate private behavior pursuant to sec­
tion five. Perhaps the Court would have come to the same conclusion 
in Morrison even if it meant overruling decisions from the mid-1960s, 
but this result seems less likely precisely because of the rhetorical 
power of precedent. 
The rhetorical force of precedent also is seen in how the Court 
writes its opinions when it does overrule earlier decisions. The Court 
describes the earlier rulings as aberrations and its current interpreta­
tion as the long-standing approach, even when that is not at all the 
case. As described above, the Court writes the opinions to avoid ac­
knowledging that there is a value choice being made, almost always 
changing the law as a result of shifts in the composition of the Court. 
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,59 the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co.,60 which had been decided just seven years earlier. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas held that Congress could override the 
Eleventh Amendment and authorize suits against states pursuant to 
any of its powers, so long as the law was clear in the text in permitting 
such litigation. But in Seminole Tribe, the Court expressly overruled 
this and held that Congress only could abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment when acting pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
What happened during those seven years between Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas and Seminole Tribe v. Florida? Did the Court find a musty, 
long-buried history of the Eleventh Amendment that showed that it 
had made a mistake? Had Pennsylvania v. Union Gas proven impossi­
ble to apply in practice? Of course not; the only difference was a 
change in the composition of the Court. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
had been a 5-4 decision with the majority comprised of Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; the dissent was 
57. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U. S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would prefer to rest 
the assertion of legislative power [on] § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  "); id. at 293 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). 
58. 529 U. S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act as exceeding the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and 
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
59. 517 U. S. 44 (1996). 
60. 491 U. S. 1 (1989). 
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Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. In the intervening years, 
four of the five in the majority - Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun - had retired from the Court, but all of the dissenters re­
mained. The four dissenters were joined by Justice Thomas to create a 
majority to overrule Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. Did the Court ex­
plain it this way? Certainly not; Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion described Pennsylvania v. Union Gas as having "deviated 
sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence."61 
Similarly, in Payne v. Tennessee,62 the Court overruled two recent 
decisions - one from two years earlier63 and the other from four years 
prior64 - and held that victim-impact statements are admissible in sen­
tencing at capital trials. Payne's overruling of recent precedent was en­
tirely a product of changes in the membership of the Court. But Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion does not even acknowledge this 
reality. Instead, the opinion in Payne focuses on why the earlier deci­
sions were aberrational departures from prior rulings and should be 
overruled. 
All of this illustrates the key point concerning the powerful role of 
precedent in constitutional opinions. Even when they are overruled, 
the Court works hard to justify why its new approach is actually con­
sistent with long-standing decisions. A significant portion of almost 
every Supreme Court opinion is about how the decisions fit within, 
and flow from, the earlier cases. 
C. Opinions Are Written to Make Decisions Seem Restrained, Rather 
Than Activist; Dissents Criticize Decisions as Activist and Not 
Restrained 
Over the last few decades, political rhetoric frequently focuses on 
whether decisions are "judicial activism." In presidential debates and 
in the judicial confirmation process, avoiding judicial activism is seen 
as an important virtue. Of course, the concepts of "judicial activism" 
and "judicial restraint" are never defined with any precision. I often 
have the sense that judicial activism is simply the label used for deci­
sions one does not like. 
The rhetoric of activism and restraint also appears in Supreme 
Court decisions, particularly in dissenting opinions. Dissenters fre­
quently characterize majority opinions as activist in nature. This is 
seen as a serious criticism, even though the normative basis for the 
conclusion is rarely explained. Obviously, judicial activism can be 
61. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45: 
62. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
63. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
64. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
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good or bad. Brown v. Board of Education was activist in the sense 
that it overturned laws in many states and overruled precedent, but 
few today would deny that it was a good decision.65 Plessy v. Ferguson 
was an exercise in judicial restraint in that it upheld a law mandating 
segregation, but it was tragic and impossible to reconcile with a com­
mitment to equal protection.66 But judicial activism can be bad, such as 
in the Lochner era,67 and judicial restraint good, such as in upholding 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.68 Although obviously each characterization 
is a value judgment, most commentators and Justices likely would 
agree with these views. However, rhetoric, both popular and in judicial 
opinions, treats judicial activism as inherently bad and judicial re­
straint as always good. 
Both liberals and conservatives are fond of characterizing the deci­
sions that they don't like as judicial activism. For example, the more 
liberal Justices have attacked the Supreme Court's federalism deci­
sions, such as in using the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress 
and in expanding sovereign immunity, as undue judicial activism.69 On 
the other hand, conservatives frequently object to decisions protecting 
individual rights on the same basis.70 
Simply put, the rhetoric of activism and restraint is quite important 
in both political discourse and judicial opinions. For the last few dec­
ades, it has been conservatives using this rhetoric to attack decisions 
expanding rights and protections under equal protection. Now, 
though, with the activism coming from the right - particularly in deci­
sions narrowing the scope of Congress's powers,71 expanding sovereign 
immunity,72 and increasing the protections of the takings clause73 - it 
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown!"). 
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
67. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a state's maximum-hour law). 
68. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
69. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting 
to the Court's holding that state governments cannot be sued in state court without their 
consent); id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833, 868 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's use of the Tenth 
Amendment as undue judicial activism). 
70. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur­
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health 
Services, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
72. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627 (1999). 
73. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001 ) (allowing takings challenges to regu­
lations that were in place at the time property was acquired). 
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will be interesting to see how, if at all, this rhetoric changes. Will con­
servatives largely abandon attacking judicial activism since the activ­
ism of today and the foreseeable future is likely to be in a conservative 
direction? Will liberals increasingly adopt this rhetoric in criticizing 
conservative decisions striking down laws based on federalism and 
property rights? 
D. The Language Used by the Court Has Changed over Time 
My impression - and this is no more than a subjective sense - is 
that the language of opinions today is less eloquent and more sarcastic 
than before. I feel less confident about the former statement and much 
more so about the latter. 
I cannot think of recent opinions that had the eloquence of Justice 
Louis Brandeis's explanation for the protection of freedom of speech 
in Whitney v. California,74 or of Justice Robert Jackson's in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.75 But perhaps this is un­
fair because these examples are exceptional opinions from the past 
that surely were atypical even then. My sense of opinions today is that 
they are much longer than they used to be, far more extensively foot­
noted, and generally less well-written than those from earlier times.76 
But it seems much more certain that there has been a great change 
in that Justices are far more willing to use a "poison pen" and be very 
sarcastic. Justice Scalia is the prime example of this phenomenon.77 In 
dissenting opinions he describes the majority's approaches as "nothing 
short of ludicrous" and "beyond the absurd,"78 "entirely irrational"79 
and not "pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny."80 He has declared that a 
majority opinion is "nothing short of preposterous" and that it "has no 
foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to."81 
He talks about how "one must grieve for the Constitution" because of 
a majority's approach.82 He calls the approaches taken in majority 
74. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
75. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
76. Some suggest that this might be attributed to the greater role of law clerks in draft­
ing opinions. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES 
CASES 257-62 (1996) (lamenting the increased role of clerks in the Supreme Court's work). 
77. This discussion is drawn from my earlier article: Chemerinsky, supra note 26. 
78. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
80. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 748 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
81. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82. Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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op1mons "preposterous"83 and "ridiculous" and "so unsupported in 
reason and so absurd in application [as] unlikely to survive. "84 He 
speaks of how a majority opinion "vandaliz[es] . . .  our people's tradi­
tions."85 
Perhaps most famously, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
he pointedly attacked Justice O'Connor for not joining him in over­
ruling Roe v. Wade and said that her position "cannot be taken seri­
ously."86 He talks about how her opinion "preserves a chaos that is 
evident to anyone who can read and count."87 He describes how "irra­
tional is the new concept that Justice O'Connor introduces into the 
law" and complains that her approach is "the least responsible."88 
In other cases, he says that he must "respond to a few of the more 
outrageous arguments in today's majority opinion, which it is beyond 
human nature to leave unanswered. "89 He describes majority opinions 
as "nothing less than Orwellian" and talks about how he is "appalled" 
by majority approaches.90 
When appraising this rhetoric, my question is whether this is how 
we want to teach law students to speak in their briefs and in courts. 
One of the primary audiences for Supreme Court opinions is law stu­
dents. The message that they take from reading Justice Scalia's opin­
ions is that this is an acceptable way to characterize positions with 
which they disagree and to talk about their adversaries. No doubt, 
Justice Scalia's pointed rhetoric makes his opinions among the most 
entertaining to read. He has a great flair for language and does not 
mince words when he disagrees with a position. But I think that this 
approach sends exactly the wrong message to law students and attor­
neys about what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal set­
ting and how it is acceptable to speak to one another. 
II. THE AUDIENCE 
A crucial part of any rhetorical enterprise is the audience. Rhetoric 
exists to persuade an audience. It is possible to identify many different 
audiences for Supreme Court decisions: a) lower courts; b) govern-
83. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 735 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 542, 543 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
86. 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). 
87. Id. at 535. 
88. Id. at 536 n.*, 537. 
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
90. Id. at 995, 998. 
August 2002] Rhetoric of Constitutional Law 2023 
meh.t officials who must follow and implement the rulings; c) lawyers 
who will litigate future cases; d) the parties to that case; e) the public; 
f) professional critics (such as journalists who cover the Court and es­
pecially law professors); and g) future Justices on the Supreme 
Court.91 
I believe that each of these audiences is important and influences, 
and normatively should influence, how opinions are written.92 In fact, 
the needs of these audiences provide criteria for evaluating Supreme 
Court opinions. Opinions are written precisely because there are im­
portance audiences for them. Thus, opinions can be evaluated based 
on how they meet the needs of these audiences. 
Also, the desire to appeal to these audiences might point in con­
flicting directions; what is best for one audience may be undesirable 
for another. Recognizing this fact can provide insights in understand­
ing particular opinions. 
A. Lower Courts 
One of the most important audiences for Supreme Court opinions 
is the lower courts that must follow them and apply them to future 
cases. This imposes a crucial duty on the Court to write its opinions so 
as to provide guidance to lower courts. In other words, the Supreme 
Court's rhetoric must serve a key functional goal: state the law in a 
manner that can be used by lower courts. 
The Court, however, often fails in this responsibility. An example 
of such failure is the Court's decision in Brown II, in which it did not 
give guidance to lower courts as to how to achieve school desegrega­
tion.93 The Court remanded the cases to the lower courts to use tradi­
tional equity principles to fashion remedies "to admit to public schools 
on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the par­
ties to these cases."94 This enigmatic statement - "deliberate 
speed"- seems an oxymoron, imposed no mandate and provided no 
91. I do not mean to imply that this is an exhaustive list of possible audiences. For ex­
ample, there may be an international audience for Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., MARY 
L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that the Cold War influenced the Court in the school desegre­
gation decisions). 
92. The extent to which Justices are consciously considering these audiences in writing 
opinions is unknown. It seems likely that some of these audiences, such as lower courts, are 
more consciously considered than others, such as professional critics. Certainly it is possible 
that the issue of audience is not thought of at all in writing a particular opinion. The discus­
sion below, however, does not depend on conscious recognition by the Justices in every case 
of the identity of the audience. Rather, the point is that descriptively these are the audiences 
for Supreme Court opinions and normatively there are implications for how opinions should 
be written because of the importance of these audiences. 
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown I I''). 
94. Id. at 301. 
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assistance to lower courts in carrying out the promise of Brown v. 
Board of Education. 
The very slow pace of desegregation of schools, in part, is a result 
of the Supreme Court's failure to specify the responsibilities of lower 
courts.95 In 1964, a decade after Brown, in the South, just 1.2% of 
black school children were attending school with whites.96 In South 
Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, not one black child attended a 
public school with a white child in the 1962-1963 school year.97 In 
North Carolina, only 1/ 5 of 1 % - or 0.026% - of the black students 
attended desegregated schools in 1961, and the figure did not rise 
above 1 % until 1965.98 Similarly, in Virginia, in 1964, only 1.63% of 
blacks were attending desegregated schools.99 Perhaps massive resis­
tance was inevitable and nothing could have changed these events; but 
maybe Supreme Court opinions detailing the duties of lower courts 
could have hastened desegregation. 
Another example of the Supreme Court's failure to give guidance 
to lower courts is its recent decision in Brentwood Academy v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n.100 In Brentwood, the Court 
found that a private entity regulating high school athletics was a state 
actor based on the government's "entwinement" with its activities. In 
finding "entwinement," Justice Souter emphasized that eighty-four 
percent of the members of the private entity were public schools, that 
the state traditionally had delegated regulating interscholastic athletics 
to the entity, that most of its funds came from public schools, and that 
most of its meetings were held on government property. The Court 
said that together these factors justified applying the Constitution to 
the private entity's activities. 
The key question concerning the Brentwood Academy case is 
whether it creates a new, broader exception to the state action doc­
trine and, if so, when it applies. Notably, Justice Souter does not use 
the traditional term in state action cases, "entanglement," in his ma­
jority opinion, but uses instead the word "entwinement." Justice 
Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion, objected that "[w]e have 
never found state action based upon mere 'entwinement.' "101 "Entan-
95. For a lengthy discussion of the failure to achieve desegregation and possible expla­
nations, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 39-166 (1991). 
96. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 7, 9 (1994). 
97. Id. at 9. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
101. Id. at 935 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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glement," in prior cases like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,102 had been found 
to require government encouragement of constitutional violations by 
private actors. But no encouragement was found in Brentwood 
Academy. Instead, the Court found that significant government in­
volvement with the private entity was sufficient for a finding of state 
action. 
This seems to be a much more expansive exception to the state ac­
tion doctrine than that found in prior cases. But the exception is not 
defined. Although the Court identifies the factors that cause it to find 
the Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Association to be a state 
actor, it offers no criteria for determining more generally when there 
is enough entwinement for state action. It almost always is possible to 
find some degree of government involvement in private conduct. How 
much is enough to meet the test for "entwinement"? The Court 
doesn't even offer clues to lower courts that will have to apply its 
opinion. 
Some, such as Professor Cass Sunstein, praise very narrow rulings 
as desirable "constitutional minimalism."103 But the problem is that 
such minimalist opinions fail the needs of a key audience for the deci­
sions: the lower courts that must follow them. 
B. Government Officials 
Because of the state action doctrine, constitutional decisions virtu­
ally always involve the government as one of the parties. Government 
officials at all levels must understand the Supreme Court's decisions 
and follow them in future actions. This imposes an important duty on 
the Court to write opinions in a way that guides these officials as to 
what is permissible and what is not allowed. Sometimes, such as in 
criminal procedure cases, the audience is the police who need guid­
ance as to what is permissible investigative behavior. Sometimes, the 
audience is the legislature that needs to be guided as to what future 
laws in the area are permissible and will not be struck down. 
This realization helps to explain and justify Supreme Court opin­
ions that are very prescriptive in terms of what the government can, or 
even must, do. For instance, in Roe v. Wade,104 the Court divided 
pregnancy into three trimesters and specified the types of regulations 
that are permissible during each.105 Some criticize the Court for this 
102. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school that was almost 
totally subsidized by the government fired teachers because of their speech). 
103. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM IN THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: 
Leaving Things Undecided, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996). 
104. 410 U.S. 1 13, 163-64 (1973). 
105. Id. 
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decision, which seems almost legislative in its dictates.106 But this criti­
cism ignores the value of the clear guidance given to legislatures by 
the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade. By describing in detail what was 
allowed and what was not permitted, the Court served the needs of 
legislatures seeking to regulate abortion after Roe. 
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona,101 the Court prescribed warnings 
that police must administer before questioning a suspect in custody. 
Miranda has been criticized as seeming unduly legislative. But this 
criticism ignores the benefit of the opinion in giving clear guidance to 
police officers as to what they need to do in order for confessions to be 
admissible. After Miranda, every officer knew exactly what to say in 
order for a confession to be presumed voluntary and likely admissible 
as evidence in court. 
Other opinions might be criticized precisely for their failure to of­
fer sufficient guidance to government officials as to how to act in the 
future. Among other criticisms, Bush v. Gore can be faulted on this 
basis.108 In Bush, the Court made it clear that it was just deciding the 
case before it and declared: "Our consideration is limited to the pres­
ent circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election pro­
cesses generally presents many complexities."109 It was predictable, 
however, that there would be lawsuits all over the country challenging 
variations within states in conducting elections and counting votes. 
Bush gives state and local election officials no guidance as to which 
variations are permissible and which are unconstitutional. 
C. Lawyers 
Another crucial audience for Supreme Court opinions are attor­
neys who must base arguments and advice to clients on them. This 
audience, like lower courts and government officials, needs guidance 
as to what constitutes an acceptable and persuasive argument. This 
imposes a burden on the Court to articulate its standards in a consis­
tent manner and to follow consistent approaches to interpreting par­
ticular constitutional provisions. 
Yet here too, the Court often fails in its opinion writing. Consider 
the Court's recent opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 
There is no consistent approach and thus little guidance to lawyers 
concerning how to argue a Fourth Amendment case or to lower courts 
regarding how to analyze one. Often the Court's approach focuses en-
106. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
107. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
108. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
109. Id. at 109. 
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tirely on "reasonableness" and balances the government's interests in 
effective law enforcement against the individual's expectations of pri­
vacy. For instance, in the recent decision Arvizu v. United States, the 
Court held that it was permissible to stop a vehicle, based solely on le­
gal and innocuous behavior because it was "reasonable" based on the 
totality of the circumstancesY0 
But sometimes the Court disavows a reasonableness inquiry and 
focuses entirely on historical practices. In Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista,111 the Court held that it is permissible for the police to arrest an 
individual for a misdemeanor that carries no possibility of a prison 
sentence. Justice Souter's majority opinion focused solely on history 
and upheld such arrests because they were allowed when the Fourth 
Amendment was ratified in 1791. Justice O'Connor's dissent stressed 
the need for a reasonableness inquiry, but the majority rejected this 
argument and focused solely on history. 
In other Fourth Amendment cases, the Court creates a bright-line 
rule that eschews a reasonableness balancing approach. In Kyllo v. 
United States, for example, the Court held that thermal imaging of a 
home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1 1 2  
Justice Scalia's majority opinion does not focus on reasonableness or 
historical practices (since thermal imaging obviously did not exist in 
1791), but instead on the need for special protection of the home in 
light of the language and history of the Fourth Amendment. 
How is a lawyer supposed to litigate Fourth Amendment issues, 
something that comes up every day in criminal courts across the coun­
try? To return to a prior point, how is a lower court to write the opin­
ion? Should the focus be on balancing, history, or a bright-line rule? 
The Court's varying and inconsistent approaches fail to give the essen­
tial guidance to those who must rely on its opinions. 
D. The Parties 
One reason for having written opinions is to provide the parties 
with an explanation for why they have won, or more importantly, lost. 
Written opinions make decisions seem not an arbitrary exercise of 
power, but a result of careful reasoning. Yet, in reading opinions, 
there is little explicit recognition that the parties are an audience for 
the opinions. Supreme Court opinions, like those of every court, are 
densely written, often using jargon and technical language. This may 
be necessary to meet the needs of other audiences, but it also means 
1 10. 534 U.S. 266 (2002). Among the factors the Court pointed to were the car being 
near a border where smuggling often occurs, the driver not waving at the police officer, the 
children looking uncomfortable, and the car being a minivan. 
1 1 1 .  532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
1 12. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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that the opinions will be difficult for many of the parties to under­
stand. 
More importantly, the way in which the Supreme Court refers to 
the parties, sometimes using deprecating language, shows, at the very 
least, inattention to this audience. An extreme example of this inatten­
tion is Justice Holmes's infamous language in Buck v. Bell, in which he 
upheld the ability of the government to impose involuntary steriliza­
tion on the mentally retarded and declared, "Three generations of im­
beciles are enough."113 Is it possible to imagine a Justice writing such a 
thing if he thought that there was a chance that the person he was 
writing about might read the opinion? In 1980, Carrie Buck was found 
to be alive and to be a woman of normal intelligence who very well 
might have read Holmes's words.114 
The Court's indifference to the parties is also reflected in other 
ways in its rulings. For example, in Tyler v. Cain, the Court ruled that 
a prisoner cannot bring a successive habeas corpus petition, even if 
there is a Supreme Court case on point making it clear that the indi­
vidual was unconstitutionally convicted, unless the Court expressly 
states that the new decision applies retroactively.1 15 In Tyler, the Court 
said that there was no relief available to an individual even though the 
jury instructions were unquestionably unconstitutional under a prior 
Supreme Court decision. These cases illustrate that the Court is willing 
to accept individuals, parties to the cases before it, being held uncon­
stitutionally and indefinitely. 
All of this creates the sense that the parties are almost incidental in 
Supreme Court opinions. The Court sees its decisions as less about re­
solving particular disputes and more about setting law for the future. 
Yet, it can be questioned whether these are as mutually exclusive as 
the Court's opinions make them seem. 
E. The Public 
The public seems an unlikely audience for Supreme Court opin­
ions. After all, relatively few members of the public actually read the 
opinions, though many learn about them through media stories. Yet, 
this is an audience that has played an important part in constitutional 
theory. Some, such as Justice Felix Frankfurter and Professors 
Alexander Bickel and Jesse Choper, have based their approaches to 
constitutional interpretation on the need to preserve and enhance the 
Court's legitimacy with the general public.116 Daniel Conkle, for ex-
1 13. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
1 14. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck 's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMM. 331, 336 (1985). 
115 .  533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
1 16. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criti­
cizing the Court's reapportionment decisions on the grounds that they will jeopardize the 
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ample, speaks of the "fragile legitimacy that attaches to Supreme 
Court pronouncements of constitutional law."117 
Yet, such concerns about this audience seem quite unfounded. At 
a time when other government institutions are often held in disrepute, 
the Court's credibility is high. Professors John M. Scheb and Williams 
Lyons set out to measure and determine this. 1 18 They conducted a sur­
vey to answer the question: "How do the American people regard the 
U.S. Supreme Court?" Their conclusion is important: 
According to the survey data, Americans render a relatively positive as­
sessment of the U.S. Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the Court fares 
considerably better in public opinion than does Congress. The respon­
dents are almost twice as likely to rate the Court's performance as 
"good" or "excellent" as they are to give these ratings to Congress. By 
the same token, they are more than twice as likely to rate Congress' per­
formance as "poor."119 
Strikingly, Scheb and Lyons found that the "Court is fairly well­
regarded across the lines that usually divide Americans."12° For exam­
ple, there are no significant differences between how Democrats and 
Republicans rate the Court's performance. 
In fact, Bush v. Gore121 lends support for the view that judicial 
credibility is not fragile and that preserving legitimacy need not be a 
primary focus in decisionmaking and opinion writing. After Bush, 
many suggested that it would undermine the Court's credibility with 
the general public. Justice Stevens expressed this concern when he 
wrote: 
[that the] position by the majority of the Court can only lend credence to 
the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land . . . .  
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the 
winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is par­
ticularly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial 
guardian of the rule of law.122 
Yet, this loss of confidence is not manifest in any apparent way. 
Opinion polls show no substantial loss of approval in the Court among 
Court's legitimacy); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 12 (2d ed. 
1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1980). 
1 17. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Legit imacy of Judicial Review in Indiv idual R ights Cases: 
Michael Perry 's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 588 (1985). 
1 18. John M. Scheb II  & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Re -
gard, 77 JUDICATURE 273 (1994). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 273-74. 
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
122. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the public.123 Why not? Perhaps it is that any loss of confidence among 
Democrats is offset by an increase in confidence among Republicans. 
Perhaps it is that people, more than commentators acknowledge, re­
alize that the Court inherently makes "political" decisions and thus 
were not "shocked" by Bush v. Gore. Perhaps it is that the public 
thought that the election was so close that any victor would be arbi­
trary and thus was willing to accept any result. Perhaps it is that any 
effects were short-lived and public concern shifted elsewhere. What­
ever the reason, Bush v. Gore certainly casts doubt on those who 
worry about the Court having fragile legitimacy with the public. 
This realization should matter greatly in decisionmaking and 
opinion writing. The Court need not worry in deciding cases as to their 
impact on public attitudes about the Court. Nor need it write opinions 
to hide its reasoning so as to make the decisions seem formalistic. The 
public is an audience, at least indirectly, for Supreme Court opinions, 
but it is not an audience whose support is fickle or likely to be lost be­
cause of a single decision or even series of rulings. 
But that does not mean that the public is an unimportant audience 
for Court decisions. Significant rulings on controversial issues will af­
fect the public. It is particularly important in such cases for opinions to 
be written in a clear and accessible manner so that the public, largely 
through media reports, can understand the Court's reasoning and the 
basis for its conclusions. Also, and this is admittedly speculation, the 
Internet will increase the number of people who actually read 
Supreme Court opinions as people can do so on their own computers 
without a need to find a law library. 
F. Professional Critics 
The most consistent readers of Supreme Court opinions are the 
journalists who are permanently at the Court and report on the rulings 
for the general public and, of course, law professors. These are the in­
dividuals who avidly read the opinions, argue over their meaning, and 
critique their writing and reasoning. 
It is hard to identify specific ways in which this audience affects the 
rhetoric of constitutional law and yet it seems inevitable that Justices 
care about what this audience has to say. Three of the nine Justices -
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer - spent most of their careers before 
going on the bench as law professors. Nor does it seem likely that any­
one can be completely immune to words of praise or criticism that are 
publicly expressed. 
But the impact of the existence of this audience is difficult to de­
scribe; it generally seems an incentive for carefully reasoned and writ-
123. See Jeffrey Jones, Hispanics, Whites, Rate Bush Positively, While Blacks are Much 
More Negative, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 2001, at 36. 
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ten opinions and, perhaps in specific cases, is a conscious influence. 
One thought is that Justices likely respond to the reactions from par­
ticular audiences, rather than general reactions from journalists or 
academics. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that liberal criticism 
of his rulings has the slightest effect on Justice Scalia, but praise from 
conservatives might matter a great deal. In other words, the impact of 
the speaker depends on his or her identity, hardly a surprising or novel 
conclusion. 
G. Future Decisions 
A final important audience for the Court's opinions is the Justices 
who will decide future cases in the area. This seems most obvious in 
concurring and dissenting opinions, which often seem to be written to 
influence future cases. For example, Justice Harlan's dissenting opin­
ion concerning the scope of Congress's powers under section five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan124 became the 
majority approach in City of Boerne v. Flores.125 The dissents con­
cerning the admissibility of victim-impact statements in Booth v. 
Maryland126 and South Carolina v. Gathers127 became the majority a 
short time later in Payne v. Tennessee.128 
More subtly, and harder to prove, is when majority opinions in­
clude language that seems placed there to be used in future decisions. 
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion dismissed a suit against the Philadelphia police on standing 
grounds but then went on to say that principles of federalism limited 
judicial review of actions by local police departments.129 This state­
ment seems to have been placed there to provide a basis for dismissing 
future cases, even where there was standing. If followed, it would have 
a profound effect in limiting review of police conduct, and perhaps 
other local tasks, by the federal courts. 
Justices surely hope that their opinions will be followed. Majority 
opinions are written to stand the test of time and to control future de­
cisions. Concurring and dissenting opinions often seem written to ap­
peal to a future Court. 
124. 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
125. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitu­
tional and holding that Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot 
expand the scope of rights or create new rights). 
126. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
127. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
128. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
129. 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976). 
2032 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:2008 
H. Conclusion 
My central point is that it is important to identify the audiences for 
Supreme Court opinions and that doing so generates important in­
sights about what the Court does and should do. The above discussion 
is preliminary; it is exhaustive about neither the audiences that exist 
nor their significance in opinion writing. 
III. THE SPEAKER 
Of course, any rhetorical enterprise involves a speaker. A few im­
portant characteristics of the speaker in judicial opinions can be iden­
tified. 
First, there is a tradition of signed opinions. Majority opinions al­
ways are written to speak for "the Court" as a whole; yet, except for 
per curium opinions, they are signed by individuals. Early in American 
history, each Justice wrote an opinion in each case, so-called "seria­
tim" opinions. Chief Justice John Marshall changed this practice, so 
that since the early nineteenth century the tradition has been a major­
ity opinion identified as having been written by a single Justice and 
joined by at least half of the other Justices on the Court.130 The tradi­
tion certainly could have developed differently, with all majority 
opinions being per curium and the identity of the authors remaining 
undisclosed. Such an approach would have increased the sense that all 
opinions are truly from the Court as a whole. 
Yet, the practice of the last two centuries of signed majority opin­
ions emphasizes the role and voice of the individual Justice at the 
same time as the edicts of the Court's majority is being expressed. Ob­
viously, Justices take very seriously their role as author and speaker 
for the Court. Recently, I noticed that in Brady v. Maryland the opin­
ion says, "Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, announced by 
Mr. Justice Brennan."131 Individual attribution is so valued that it is 
even identified when another Justice reads the opinion from the 
bench. 
The importance of authorship also is reflected in instances in which 
the Court deviates from its usual practices. For instance, in Cooper v. 
Aaron, each Justice individually signed the majority opinion to con­
vey, clearly and unequivocally, the Court's insistence that state courts 
and governments comply with federal desegregation orders.132 A fed­
eral district court had ordered the desegregation of the Little Rock, 
130. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
1835, at 186 (abr. ed. 1 991). 
131. 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963) (holding that prosecutors must disclose to defendants poten­
tially exculpatory evidence). 
132. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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Arkansas, public schools. The State disobeyed this order, in part, 
based on professed concern that compliance would lead to violence, 
and, in part, based on a claim that it was not bound to comply with ju­
dicial desegregation decrees. 
In an unusual opinion, signed individually by each Justice, the 
Court rejected this position and emphatically declared: 
[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is su­
preme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle 
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma­
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows 
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this 
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .  
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the 
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.133 
The Court strongly reaffirmed Brown and said that it could not be 
nullified either "openly and directly by state legislators or state execu­
tive or judicial officers" or "indirectly by them through evasive 
schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenu­
ously.' "134 
The choice to have every Justice individually sign this opinion ob­
viously was done for rhetorical purposes. The Justices wanted to 
communicate a message to Little Rock and to the country about their 
views with regard to desegregation orders and the duty of state and lo­
cal governments to obey them. 
Another example was the joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.135 Rather than 
the usual practice of one Justice authoring an opinion, joined by the 
other two, each of these three Justices signed as author of the opinion. 
Again, this choice seems clearly to have been motivated by rhetorical 
considerations: the Justices saw themselves as announcing an impor­
tant resolution of a controversial and crucial issue. Indeed, the first 
sentence of their opinion indicates their sense of authoring a very sig­
nificant opinion: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt."136 
A second rhetorical aspect of the Supreme Court as speaker is its 
desire for unanimity in handing down decisions where there is a seri­
ous risk of disobedience by government officials. Brown v. Board of 
Education is an obvious example of this.137 Many have written how 
133. Id. at 18. 
134. Id. at 17 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)). 
135. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a fascinating account of how this opinion came to be writ­
ten, see EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 459-86 (1999). 
136. Id. at 844. 
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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newly appointed Chief Justice Earl Warren perceived a need for una­
nimity to convey a clear message to the country, and particularly to 
southern states, about the Court's resolve and commitment.138 In fact, 
every desegregation case for twenty years was unanimous undoubt­
edly for this reason.139 
Similarly, unanimity undoubtedly was perceived as important in 
United States v. Nixon,140 where the Court ordered President Nixon to 
produce the Watergate tapes that quickly led to his resignation.141 
There was a real chance that President Nixon would disobey the 
Court's order, especially if the Court was closely divided or there was 
any ambiguity in its opinion.142 
In cases like these, unanimity serves a key rhetorical function. A 
unanimous decision conveys a message of the Court's agreement and 
its resolve. It undermines the ability of an official considering dis­
obeying the Court to argue that the decision was partisan or uncertain. 
One more aspect of the Court as speaker that merits mention: the 
need to produce an opinion that gains support of a majority undoubt­
edly has a powerful effect on how many opinions are written. This of­
ten exercises a powerful effect on how Justices' opinions are written. 
Especially when the Court is closely divided, Justices write opinions in 
a way to keep their majority. For instance, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC,143 Justice Brennan's majority opinion upholding preferences 
for minority-owned businesses in broadcast licensing invoked Justice 
White's earlier opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC which 
had upheld the Fairness Doctrine.144 Although the issues in the case 
were quite different, Brennan seemed to be writing the opinion to ap­
peal to White and his commitment to ensuring a diversity of views 
over the broadcast media. 
Brown v. Board of Education and the desegregation cases that 
followed it again provide an important illustration. Neither in Brown 
nor in any of the subsequent desegregation decisions did the Court 
condemn laws requiring segregation as inherently violative of equal 
138. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 679-99 (1975); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
EARL WARREN 165-69 (1982). 
139. The unanimity in desegregation cases ended in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974) (holding 5-4, that inter-district desegregation remedies are permissible only if there is 
proof of an inter-district violation). 
140. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
141. For an account of how Nixon was written within the Court, see BOB WOODWARD 
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 301-47 (1979). 
142. Nixon apparently raised the possibility of disobedience with his top advisers and 
they pointed to the unanimity of the decision and its clear order in persuading him to com­
ply. See BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 264 (1976). 
143. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
144. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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protection. Brown, of course, focused on the consequences of segrega­
tion in education. The subsequent cases striking down Jim Crow laws 
were handed down without any opinions.145 It is unclear why, but the 
answer surely is about the rhetorical message. Perhaps it is because 
the Court could not agree on an opinion so it simply announced a re­
sult.146 Also, the Court's approach conveyed a sense that the conclu­
sions were clear and obvious, so much so that no opinions were 
needed. 
CONCLUSION 
My central thesis is that Supreme Court opinions are a rhetorical 
enterprise and that this fact profoundly influences much of what the 
Court does and also how the Court's decisions should be evaluated. 
To paraphrase an old song, it's only words, but words are often all we 
have. 
145. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affg mem. 142 F.Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956) 
(municipal bus system); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating mem. 223 F.2d 93 
(5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf course); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. 
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, affg mem. 220 F.2d 386 ( 4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches). 
146. The cases did not obviously flow from Brown precisely because Brown focused on 
education and thus could not be used by itself to explain why segregation of beaches, buses, 
or golf courses is unconstitutional. 
